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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS PHILLIP A. BULLEN, 
JAY R. BINGHAM, 0.C. HAMMOND, JAY DEE 
HARRIS, BEVERLY D. KUMPFER, SNELL OLSEN, 
REX G. PLOWMAN, W.B. ROBINS, ALVA C. 
SNOW, WILLIAM R. STOCKDALE, JANE S. 
TIBBALS, GLENN L. TAGGART, DEE A. BROADBENT 
and L. MARK NEUBERGER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
1. The Primary Action 
This action was commenced by plaintiff-respondent Utah State 
University (hereinafter "the University") in December, 1975 to 
recover losses and expenses allegedly sustained by the University in 
connection with its purchase and sale of various securities between 
December, 1971 and September, 1972. The University seeks to recover 
losses and expenses which it allegedly incurred in connection with 
stock transactions executed by Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, 
Inc. (hereinafter "Hornblower") on the University's behalf. The 
University contends that it is entitled to recover from Hornblower 
because the transactions were ultra vires. 
2. The Third Party Action 
In addition to denying liability in the primary action, Hornblower 
filed a third-party complaint in August, 1977 seeking indemnity or 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
contribution from a number of other entities and individuals.~; 
Among the individuals named as third party defendants were offi-
cials at the University who allegedly authorized the investments in 
question. Those individuals included members of University's 
Institutional CouncilVand several of the University's administra-
torsV (hereinafter referred to as "Respondents"). 
This brief is respectfully submitted in the captioned action on 
behalf of the following individual Respondents Phillip A. Bullen, 
Jay R. Bingham, o.c. Hammond, Jay Dee Harris, Beverly D. Kumpfer, 
Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, w. B. Robins, Alva Snow, William 
Stockdale, Jane S. Tibbals, Glenn L. Taggart, Dee A. Broadbent, and 
L. Mark Neuberger in response to Hornblower's opening brief.!_; 
y Apart from the Appel lees involved in these appeals, Hornblower's 
third party complaint also asserted claims against the State, the 
Institutional Council, and a bank which had acted as transfer agent 
in the security transactions at issue. Hornblower's claim against the 
foregoing entities were dismissed by the trial court Hornblower 
has apparently chosen not to appeal those rulings. 
V Phillip A. Bullen, Jay R. Bingham, o.c. Hammond, Jay Dee Harris, 
Beverly D. Kumpfer, Snell Olsen, Rex G. Plowman, W.B. Robins, Alva Snow/ 
William Stockdale, and Jane s. Tibbals were Institutional Council ' 
members during the period in question. 
V The University Administrators were Glenn L. Taggart (President), 
Dee A. Broadbent (Vice-President for Business Affairs) and L. Mark 
Neuberger (Secretary to the University's Institutional Council) 
The third-party complaints also named Donald A. Catron, another 
administrator who actually ran the investment program on a 
day-to-day basis, as a defendant. Mr. Catron is separately 
represented. 
V By order of this Court dated March 20, 1979, the appeals in this 
action were consolidated with the appeals in four similar cases. 
Hornblower's opening brief was also submitted on behalf of stock-
brokers in three of those other cases. 
-2-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
These Respondents moved to dismiss Hornblower's third-party 
complaint for failure to state a cause of action. On March 21, 1978, 
the trial court granted Respondent's motion to dismiss after ex-
tensive briefing and oral argument. The trial court certified its 
ruling as final for the purposes of appeal on January 3, 1979. 
The trial court also entered various orders in the primary 
action between the University and Hornblower, from which Hornblower 
is presently appealing and which are described in Hornblower's 
brief.:.J Those issues to .not directly relate to these Respondents 
and are, accordingly, not addressed in this brief. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
These Respondents seek affirmance of the trial court's order 
dismissing Hornblower's third-party complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Each of the individual Respondents on whose behalf this 
brief is submitted either held a position on the Institutional 
Council of Utah State University or held a position as an upper 
level administrator at the University during the period of the 
investment program in question. The Institutional Council 
~/Hornblower's brief, p. 1-2. 
-3-
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members were largely chosen from the members of the community, 
while the administrators were essentially professionals in the 
field of education. By virtue of their positions, the 
Respondents were responsible for supervising most of the Uni-
sity operations. concerned the University. Those responsibilites 
encompassed a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from supervision 
of athletic and academic programs to supervision of the University's 
property and financial affairs. 
Hornblower has laid out an elaborate and lengthy statement 
of facts in its brief which describes the involvement of these 
Respondents in the investment program in issue. Although that 
statement of facts contains much that should properly be labeled 
argument, no purpose would be served by attempting to identify the 
inaccuracies or to separate the fact from conjecture in the 
Hornblower brief, because the position of these Respondents with 
respect to the facts in this case is determined by the procedural 
posture of the case. This is an appeal by Hornblower from the 
dismissal of its third-party complaint. As such the relevant facts 
are those which were alleged in that third-party complaint. 
In its third-party complaint Hornblower alleged the 
following as the factual predicate for its claims against 
these Respondents: 
1. Hornblower alleged that these Respondents approved 
one or more resolutions which represented that the 
University had authority to purchase and sell securities. 
-4-
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The resolutions designated Donald Catron as one of 
the individuals who was empowered to direct pur-
chases and sales of securities on the University's 
behalf. (R. 475). 
2. Hornblower further alleged that these Respondents 
ra~ified Ca~ron's actions by reviewing periodic reports 
which described the transactions Catron had entered 
into on the University's behalf (R. 476). 
3. Hornblower further alleged that it relied upon the 
foregoing actions by these Appellees in executing the 
securities transactions in question on the University's 
behalf (R. 477). 
Solely for the purposes of this appeal, the factual allega-
tions of Hornblower's third-party complaint will be treated as 
though true.~/ 
It is Respondents' position that the trial court properly 
dismissed Hornblower's third-party complaint for the reasons 
set forth in the following sections of this brief. 
~In its brief, Hornblower incorrectly contends that the Court 
must al so treat as true the following allegations: ( 1) that 
Appellees exceeded their statutory authority in authorizing or 
ratifying the securities transactions in issue and (2) allegations 
that Appellees' actions gave rise to an express or implied agreement 
to indemnify Hornblower against liability arising out of the 
transactions in question. Appellees submit those allegations are 
conclusions of law which are not admitted by a motion to dismiss. 
E.g. ~ v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974); Mirin v. 
Justices of the Nevada Supreme Court, 415 F.Supp. 1178, 1181 
(D.Nev.1976) (construing identical federal rule). Even if true, 
however, those allegations would not be sufficient to state a cause 
of action against Appellees, for the reasons set forth in the 
following sections of this brief. 
-5-
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I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
HORNBLOWER'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THESE INDIVIDUAL 
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO 
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY 
A. As Public Officials, These Respondents 
Are Entitled To Immunity For Acts Performed 
In Good Faith And Within The Scope Of 
Their Duties 
--
Public officials, both in Utah and elsewhere, have long enjoyed 
a qualified immunity from suits growing out of the performance of 
their duties. ~Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 575, 79 S.Ct. 1335 
(1959); Board of Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 
Utah 576, 280 P. 1069 (1929) Such immunity has been deemed necessary 
to assure that public officials are free to exercise their duties 
unencumbered by the fear of damage suits growing out of the 
performance of their duties -- suits which consume time and energy 
letter devoted to public service and which deter competent 
individuals from assuming the responsibi- ities of public office. 
Anderson v.Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413 P.2d 597 
(1966); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 340-41 (1973). 
The scope of immunity to which particular officials are 
entitled varies, depending on the nature of the officials' 
responsibilities. Barr v. Matteo, 360 u.s. 575, 79 s.ct. 1335 
(1959); Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977). 
Officials such as Respondents, who are charged with a wide range 
-6-
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of duties and responsibilities that require the exercise of judgment 
and discretion, must be and are accorded a relatively broad form 
of immunity. Smith v. ~' 485 F.2d at 343-344. 
This Court has, accordingly, recognized the need for such 
protection. It has repeatedly extended immunity to officials charged 
with discretionary duties. ~ Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 
312, 445 P.2d 367 (1968); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 324, 241 
P.2d 907 (1952). So long as such officials have acted in good 
faith and within the scope of the matters committed to their super-
vision or control, they have been accorded immunity. Anderson v. 
Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d at 407, 413 P.2d at 599 (1966); 
Board of Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 
280 P. 1069 (1929); Prosser, The Law of Torts, Sec. 132 pp. 988-991 
{4th Ed. 1971); 4 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, Sec. 12.208. 
As this Court has succinctly stated: 
... it is the settled policy of the law that when 
a public official acts in go0d faith, believing 
what he does to be within the scope of his authority 
and in the line of his duty, he is not liable for 
damages even if he makes a mistake in the exercise 
of his judgment. 
Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d at 407, 413 P.2d at 599. 
In these related actions Respondents' official immunity fully 
justified dismissal of Hornblower's third-party complaint. Horn-
blower's complaint sought to hold Respondents personally liable for 
actions which Respondents took in supervising the University's 
financial affairs. Yet that complaint utterly failed to allege 
facts sufficient to impose personal liability on Respondents. 
-7-
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hornblower could not and did not allege that Appellees had ever 
acted in bad faith. The undisputed fact is that Respondents were at 
all times acting in good faith. Nor could Hornblower allege that 
Respondents had acted outside the scope of their duties, for the 
responsibility of overseeing investment Of the University's funds lS 
one of the many duties imposed upon Respondents by statute. Utah Code 
Annotated Secs. 53-48-10(5); 53-48-20(3).2/ 
In short, Hornblower's third-party complaint did not allege 
facts which would justify stripping Respondents of their immunity for 
actions which they took in a good faith effort to carry out their 
duties. Respondents respectfully submit, therefore, that the trial 
court properly dismissed Hornblower's third-party complaint. 
B. Respondents Are Er.titled To Immunity 
Even If They Inadvertently Exceeded 
Their Authority, Because ~hey were 
Acting In Good Faith And Within The 
Scope Of Their Duties 
In its brief Hornblower has recognized the existence of the 
official immunity doctrine. However, Hornblower has argued that 
Respondents are not entitled to immunity in these actions because 
Respondents "exceeded their authority" by authorizing investments 
2J U.C.A.Sec.53-48-10(5) (1970) provides, in relevant part, that 
each university may handle its own financial affairs under the 
general supervision of the Board of Hia~er Education, which has 
delegated such duties to the Institutional Council. 
U.C.A. Sec.53-48-20(3)(1970) provioes, :..: relevant part, that an 
institution may retain, accumulate, invest, commit and expend 
funds received for research programs authorized by the Board. 
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which were later determined to be ultra vires.~/ Hornblower's 
apparent contention that public officials may be held personally 
liable whenever they exceed their authority seriously 
misconstrues the limits of the immunity doctrine. 
The primary flaw in Hornblower's argument is its failure to 
acknowledge that an official may unwittingly exceed his authority 
while still acting within the scope of the matters committed to 
his supervision or control. As noted above, the scope of an 
official's immunity is determined by the nature of the official's 
responsibilities. Officials such as Respondents, whose duties 
require the exercise of judgment and discretion, enjoy a broader 
form of immunity than those officials and employees whose duties 
are purely ministerial in nature. Connell v. Tooele City, 572 
P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977); Board of Education of Nebo School 
District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P.1065, 1069 (1929); Smith 
v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1973); Prosser, The 
Law of Torts, Sec. 132, pp. 988-989 (4th Ed. 1971). Courts do 
not permit officials who are charged with discretionary 
responsibilities to be held liable simply because they have 
inadvertently "exceeded their authority." 
Instead, as the Supreme Court long ago noted, "A distinction 
must be ..• observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear 
2'.J Hornblower brief, p. 70-73. This Court determined that such 
transactions were ultra vires in 1975. First Equity Corp. of 
Florida v. Utah StatetJn1V'ei?Sity, 544 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975). 
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absence of all jurisdiction." Bradley v. Fisher, 80 u.S.335, 
351-52, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S.483, 
498, 16 S.Ct.631, 637 (1896); C.J.S. "Officers" Sections 125-
127. Only in the latter case -- i.e., when officials have 
acted totally outside the scope of the matters committed to their 
control and supervision -- may they be held personally liable. 
Thus, it is well established that officials cannot be held 
personally liable so long as they act in good faith and within 
the scope of the matters committed to their supervision, even though 
they may "exceed their authority" through an error in judgment. Fm 
instance, in Anderson v. Granite School District, 17 Utah 2d 405, 413 
P.2d 597 (196f), several landowners attempted to hold the individual 
members of a school board personally liable for official acts taken 
in connection with the acquisition of property for a new school, a 
matter within the scope of the board members' duties. Despite allega-! 
tions in the landowners' complaint that the school board members had 
exceeded their authority, this Court upheld dismissal of that 
complaint, stating: 
.•. it is the settled policy of the law that when a 
public official acts in good faith, believing what 
he does to be within the scope of his authority and 
in the line of his duty, he is not liable for 
damages even if he makes a mistake in the exercise 
of his judgment. [footnote omitted] 
17 Utah 2d at 407, 413 P.2d at 599. 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Numerous decisions, both in Utah and elsewhere, reflect the 
same principle.~/ A good example of the application of that principle 
to facts resembling those here is Lister v. Board of Regents of 
~/ ~' Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367, 369 
(1968) (prison warden could not be held personally liable for 
negligent supervision so long as he was acting in good faith and 
within the scope of his duties); Hjorth v. Whittenburg, 121 Utah 
324, 241 P.2d 907, 909 (1952) (members of Road Commission could not 
be held personally liable for damages arising "out of the faithful 
and honest performance of their duties"); Board of Education of 
Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P.1065 (1920) 
(county treasurer could not be held liable for erroneous decision 
made in good faith); Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973) 
(university officials--rn-ITtah charged with broad duties could not be 
held personally liable for official acts unless malice was shown); 
Standard Nut Margarine Co. v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557, 559 (D.C.Cir. 
1934) (Tax Commissioner could not be held personally liable for 
erroneous construction and application of statute, as it was a 
matter committed to his control and supervision); Gregoire v. 
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) ("What is meant by saying 
that the officer must be acting within his power cannot be more than 
that the occasion must be such as would have justified the act, if 
he had been using his power for any of the purposes on whose account 
it was vested in him"); Cole v. Tuttle, 366 F.Supp. 1252, 1254 
(N.D.Miss. 1973) (prison board officials could not be held indi-
vidually liable for alleged neglige'nce by Board in administering 
prison); Miller v. City and County of San Francisco, 187 Cal.App.2d 
480, 483, 9 Cal. Rptr.767 (1960) (city officials misrepresented 
to plaintiff that city would take action which the officials 
had no power to authorize; held: no liability because officials 
were acting within scope of their employment); Martelli v. Pollack, 
162 Cal.App.2d 655, 328 P.2d 795, (1958) (city officials 
could not be held personally liable for entering into ultra vires 
contract, even though "they may have labored under somemisappre-
hension as to the scope of their powers"); Gildea v. Ellershaw, 363 
Mass. 800, 298 N.E.2d 847 (1973) (city officials who followed 
erroneous procedure in removing city manager could not be held 
personally liable for errors in exercise of judgment and dis-
cretion); w:r;ayv. McMahon, 183Miss. 592, 182 So.99, 100 (1938) 
(city officials could not be held personally liable for negligence 
or error in appointing police officers); Lister v. Board of Regents 
of Universit of Wisconsin S stem, 72 Wis.2d 282, 240, N.W.2d 610, 
621-22 (1976 (university officials could not be held personally 
liable for damages arising from their allegedly erroneous interpreta-
tion of statute and acts in excess of statutory authority). 
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University of Wisconsin S:stem, 72 Wis.2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610 
(1976). There, as here, the plaintiff sought to hold university 
officials personally liable, claiming that the officals had ex-
ceeded their statutory authority. In affirming dismissal of that 
complaint, the Wisconsin Supreme Court statec: 
The general rule is that a public officer is not 
personally liable to one injured as a result of an 
act performed withir. the scope of his Official 
authority and in the line of his official duty ..• 
* * * 
The complaint in tr.is action contains allegations 
that [the defendant] miscon:trued or misapplied 
sec. 36.16, Stats., thereby ex~eed~ng his autl ~rity 
and power under that statu~ It :s clear tha~ 
the protection afforded by -~e principle of civil 
immunity attaches only ~o the consequences of 
official conduct and c:es :,ot extend to an 
officer's actions as a pr1. ate citizen. However, 
for t;;e purpose of impc:,sing lialility for damages, 
a distinction must be ~ade between those acts 
which constitute a mistake of judgment within the 
officer's lawful authority and those which are 
completely outside that authority. [The defendant's] 
conduct in this case clearly falls within the former 
category and, therefore, within the scope of the 
immunity. [footnotes omitted] 240 N.W.2d at 622. 
In the cases presently before the Court, Hornblower sought to 
hold Respondents personally liabl• for discretionary acts which wen 
performed in good faith and were within the scope of the matters 
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committed to Respondents' supervision and control.~/ As noted above, 
Respondents are responsible under the statutes of this State for over-
seeing the University's financial affairs. Utah Code Annotated,(1970) 
Secs. 53-48-10(5); 53-48-20(3). The acts for which Hornblower 
sought to hold Respondents liable fell squarely within the scope of 
the foregoing duties; as such, Respondents are entitled to immunity. 
The cases cited in Hornblower's brief do not indicate otherwise. 
The primary case upon which Hornblower relies simply illustrates that 
the immunity enjoyed by public employees who are performing purely 
ministerial duties is narrower than that for public officials who 
are performing discretionary duties. Cornwall v. Larsen, 571 P.2d 
925, 927 (Utah 1977) ("In this case, the defendant ... was an 
employee performing a ministerial act and not a discretionary 
act. .. " [emphasis in original)). The other cases cited by the 
Brokers are equally inapposite . .:_:; 
10 / There is no question that Respondents were performing discre-
Tionary acts when they authorized or ratified the investment of 
University funds. At the prompting of the Governor and State 
Auditor, Respondents determined that idle University funds could be 
best employed by investing them. Such a decision undoubtedly 
required the exercise of judgment on the part of these Respondents. 
See Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1977); Board of 
Education of Nebo School District v. Jeppson, 74 Utah 576, 280 P. 
1065, 1069 (1929); Lister v. Board of Regents of Univ. Wis. System, 
72 Wis.2d 282, 240 N.W.2d 610, 621-22 (1976). 
~l; In only two of the other decisions cited by Hornblower were 
public officials actually held liable. The first of those 
decisions, Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d 430 
(1971), is inapplicable because like the Cornwall case, it 
" ... involved a ministerial function only", 25 Utah 2d at 390, 483 
P.2d at 432. The other decision simply held that officials could be 
held liable if they acted " ... entirely outside the scope of their 
official duties" (emphasis added). Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 
527, 57 P.2d 1128, 1131 (1936). Neither decision warrants holding 
Respondents liable in this case. 
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In summary, Hornblower's third-party complaint could not 
allege that Respondents had acted in bad faith or totally beyond the 
scope of their duties. In the absence of such all~:ations, there is 
no basis for stripping Respondents of their immun. ', as the trial 
court properly recognized. 
II. HORNBLOWER'S THIRD-PAR'l'Y COMPLAINT 
DID NOT STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR 
INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION. 
While there is some diversity in the labels which Hornblower has 
applied to the causes of action i~ its third pcrty complaint, the 
facts alleged in each count of the third party complaint are 
identical. Hornblower contends that those facts entitle it to 
recover either indemnity or contribution from Respondents. 
Respondents respectfully submit that the facts alleged in thr thi~ 
party complaint are insufficient ':o sus::.ain an action for eit::er 
indemnity or contribution for the reasons set forth below, even if 
Resondents were not public officials entitled to official immunity. 
A. Hornblower is Barred from Seeking 
Indemnity Because It Actively 
Participated in the Events Giving 
Rise to Liability 
Even if Respondents were not public officials entitled to the 
b~nefit of official immunity, Hr.::-nb:..ower' s third-party complaint 
would not be sufficient to state a =aus~ of action for indemnity. 
Hornblower would be barred from seeking indemnity, because it 
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played an active and essential role in the transactions giving rise 
to liability -- buying and selling securities, extending credit, and 
receiving commissions. In light of its active participation, Horn-
blower could not and cannot shift all liability in connection with 
those transactions to Respondents. 
It is well established that no right to indemnity exists where 
a person has actively participated in the events giving rise to 
liability. Bettilyon Construction Co. v. State Road Commission, 20 
Utah 2d 319, 437 P.2d 449, 450 (1968); Schneider v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 
2d 35, 327 P.2d 822, 826 (1958); Pinal County v. Adams, 13 Ariz. 
App. 571, 479 P.2d 718 (1971); William F. Larrick v. Burt Chevr~ 
let, Inc., 147 Colo. 133, 362 P.2d 1030 (1961); Bush Terminal Bldgs. 
v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 9 N.Y.2d 426, 174 N.E.2d 516, 214 N.Y.S.2d 
428 (1961). A right to indemnity will be granted only where an 
individual is held vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of 
another or where there is so great a difference between the 
culpability of two tortfeasors that one of them should be forced to 
bear the entire loss. Cahill Brothers, Inc. v. Clementina Co., 208 
Cal.App.2d 367, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1962); Rio Grande Gas Co. v. 
Strahmann Farms, Inc., 80 N.M. 432, 457 P.2d 364 (1969). See also 
Chamberlain v. McCleary, 217 F.Supp. 591, 597 (E.D. Tenn. 1963). 
Here the facts do not justify shifting Hornblower's liability to 
these Respondents. If Hornblower is held liable to the University, it 
will presumably be because it had a duty to determine for itself 
whether the University had authority to enter into the transactions 
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in question.~/ Yet, if Hornblower has failed to fulfill that 
duty, it may not seek indemnity from these Respondents. Even if 
these Respondents were charged with a simi~ar duty, as Hornblower 
has vigorously contended, Hornblower and Respo~dents would be no 
more than joint tortfe~sors. Under those ci;~umstances no action 
for indemnity would lie, even under the cases cited by 
Hornblower.~/ 
There is simply no great difference in the culpability ,or 
lack of culpability) of Hornblower and Res,r-ondents such as is neces-
sary to justify an indemnity action. The fact that Hornblower's 
knowledge of the limits of the University's powers is merely con-
structive knowledge does not justify shifting liability for ~. ose 
~ See First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Ut~h State University, 
544 P.26 at 892 
See further Rule 405 of the New York Stock Exchange imposing a 
similar duty upon Hornblower. 2 CCH New York State Exchange Guide, 
Paras.2405, 2405.10 
~ For example, in Hoagan v. Cahoon, 26 Utah 444, 73 P.512, 514 
(1903), the Court noted " .•. 'It is only where a person knows or 
must be presumed to know that his act was unlawful, that the law 
will refuse to aid him in seeking an indemnity or contribution ... ' 
We admit the rule that the law will not endorse contribution nor 
indemnity between wrongdoers But that rule aoes not apply to any 
case where the act of the asent was not manifestly illegal in itself 
and was done bona fide in the execution of his agency and without 
knowledge (either actual or implied by law) that it was illegal.··" 
[citations omitted; emphasis added)) 
In order for Hornblower to be held liable to the ~niversity und~r 
the principles announced in the First Equity case, Hornblower would 
have to be charged with constructive .1rnowledge that the investments 
in question were ultra vires. First Lquity Corp. of FloriGa v. ~ 
State University, 544 P:2"Cf"at 892. As the foregoing statement from 
the Hoggan case makes clear, such knowledge would bar an action for 
indemnity. See further Trimble v. exchange Bank of Kentucky, 23 ~· 
L • Rep • 3 6 7 , 6 2 S . w • 10 2 7 ( 19 O 1 ) . 
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transactions to Respondents -- for Respondents' "knowledge" would also 
be constructive. Nor does the fact that Respondents passed resolu-
tions authorizing the opening of accounts with Hornblower justify 
holding the Appellees personally liable. Hornblower is a sophis-
ticated investment house. It had access to the statutes of this 
State and to attorneys who could interpret those statutes for it. 
In short, Hornblower played an active and essential role in the 
transactions giving rise to liability. As such, it is barred from 
shifting all responsibility for these transactions to Appellees. 
B. Respondents Cannot Be Held Individually 
Liable For Warranties Or Representations 
Made By The Institutional Council As A Whole 
In its brief Hornblower argues that its third-party complaint 
states a cause of action for misrepresentation or breach of warranty. 
It contends that resolutions passed by the Institutional Council, 
authorizing the opening of accoun~s with Hornblower, incorrectly 
represented that the University had authority to invest in common 
stocks.~/ 
It matters not whether Hornblower's characterization of the 
Council's resolutions is correct. Even if the resolutions con-
stituted representations or warranties, they were representations or 
warranties made by the Institutional Council as a whole and not by 
the individual members of the Council. If Hornblower has a cause of 
action for misrepresentation or breach of warranty, it is a claim 
~Hornblower Brief, pp. 66-68. 
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against the Institutional Council, not against these individual 
Respondents. 
The foregoing principle has been recognized in similar cases ~e~ 
attempts have been made to ;old public officials personally liable on 
ultra vires contracts which they had entered into on behalf of 
public entities. In a majority of jurisdictions which have con-
sidered the issue, it is held that a public official can~ be held 
personally liable on such a contract. Those decisions have been 
summarized by a no~ed commentator as follows: 
Ordinarily when an officer or public agent 
contracts in good faith with parties having 
knowledge of the extent of his authority or 
who have equal means of knowledge, especially 
where the authority of the officer is pre-
scribed by law, he will not become individually 
responsible unless the intent to incur liability 
is clearly expressed, although it should be 
found that, ~~~ough ignorance of the law, he 
may have exceeded his authority. 
4 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, Section 12.214.~/ 
Here, any warranty or representation was made by the Council u 
a whole, not by the individual Respondents. If HorntJower has a 
claim for misrepresentation or breach of warranty, i~ is a claim 
against the Council. It cannot reasonably be contended that 
Respondents made any representations or warranties in their 
individual capacities for which they could be held personally 
liable. 
~ In addition to the d·2cisions cited by Mc2t.::.::. .en see Toronto v. 
McBride, 29 U.C.Q.B. 13 (1869) 
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c. Hornblower's Third-Party Comelaint 
Did Not State A Cause of Action 
For Contribution 
In the alternative to its claims for indemnity, Hornblower's 
third-party complaint attempted to state a cause of action for 
contribution, on the theory that Hornblower and Respondents were 
joint tortfeasors (R. 482-483). However, Hornblower failed to 
recognize that there is no right to contribution between joint 
tortfeasors in Utah for acts committed prior to May 8, 1973, the 
effective date of the Utah Contribution Statute.~ Brunyer v. 
Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (1976). 
In Brunyer, this Court held that the Utah statute governing 
contribution between joint tortfeasors has no retroactive effect. 
Affirming the dismissal of a third-party complaint, the Court stated, 
The contribution statute established a primary 
right and duty which was not in existence at 
the time the injuries in this case arose, and 
the statute not being retroactive by its terms 
did not create a right on behalf of the third-
party plaintiffs. 551 P.2d at 522. 
In the cases now before the Court, all the acts on which Horn-
blower bases its claim for contribution occurred between December, 
1971 and September, 1972 prior to the effective date of the con-
tribution statute. As such, Hornblower's claim for contri-
bution failed to state a cause of action and was properly dismissed. 
In its brief Hornblower has contended that under Utah common 
law it was entitled to maintain a cause of action for contribution 
~/Utah Code Annotated, (1970) Sec. 78-27-39. 
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bution • ..:2; In support of that contention Hornblower relies upon 
dicta in several cases which actually dealt with principles of 
indemnity.~ However, in cases where this Court has actually 
dealt with the right to contribution it has expressly held that no 
right to contribution existed among joint tortfeasors under the 
common law of this State. For instance, in Hardman v. Matthews, 
l Utah 2d 110, 262 P. 2d 748 (Utah 1953), this Court upheld tr, -
dismissal of a third-party complaint seeking contribution, stc~ing, 
••. contribution cannot be had between jcint 
or concurring tort-feasors in a case like 
this, unless s~nctioned by statute, there 
being none sue~ in Utah. 
262 P.2d at 749. In Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, supra, this Court 
again observed, in dismissing a claim for contribution, that 
The contribution statute established a 
primary right and duty which was not in 
existence at the time the injuries in 
this case arose. 551 P.2d at 522. 
Accordingly, Respondents respectfully submit that the trial 
court did not err in dismissing Hornblower's claim for contribution. ' 
!:!./Hornblower Brief, p. 68. 
~/Hornblower Brief, p. 68, Fn. 197. 
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III. IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE UNIVERSITY'S 
COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION, IT SHOULD SUMMARILY AFFIRM DIS-
MISSAL OF HORNBLOWER'S THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT 
These Respondents respectfully submit that Hornblower's third-
party complaint failed to state a cause of action and was properly 
dismissed for the reasons set forth above; however, it should also 
be noted that there are other issues presently pending before this 
Court, the resolution of which could make a decision on the suffi-
ciency of Hornblower's third-party complaint unnecessary. 
In its brief Hornblower has argued, among other things, 
that the University's complaint in the primary action failed to 
state a cause of action.~ Hornblower contends that (a) the 
securities transactions in question were not ultra vires and (b) 
that the University should not be permitted to maintain these 
actions even if the transactions were ultra vires. Hornblower has 
advanced substantial arguments-in support of both positions. If 
this Court agrees that the University's complaint in the primary 
action failed to state a cause of action, then Respondents submit that 
this Court may summarily affirm dismissal of Hornblower's third-
party complaint without reaching the issues discussed in the fore-
going sections of this brief. 
Hornblower cannot maintain an action over if it is not held 
liable in the first instance. Under Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of 
~/Hornblower Brief, pp. 31-61. 
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Civil Procedure, a defendant--third-party plaintiff may only maintain 
a claim against a party " •.. who is or may be liable to him for all~ 
part of the plaintiff's claim against him." If Hornblower is not 
liable to the University, i.e., the plaintiff, it has no basis for 
maintaining a third-party claim against these Appellees under Rule 
14. E.g. Southern Milling Co. v. U.S., 270 F.2d 80, 84 (5th Cir. 
1959). (construing identical provision of federal Rule 14). ("If 
there had been no recovery against the appellant-defendant there 
could have been no liability on the third-party claim.")~/ 
Respondents respectfully submit, therefore, that if the 
University's complaint against Hornblower falls, Hornblower's 
third-party complaint against Respondents r:1ust also fall. 
20; It has been suggested in Hornblower's brief that this Court 
must rule on the sufficiency of the third-party complaint even if 
the Court concludes that the University's complaint failed to state 
a cause of action, because Hornblower has included its attorneys 
fees among the sums for which it claims indemnity (Hornblower brief, 
p. 62). That contention is erroneous. Hornblower's attorneys fees 
do not constitute a portion of the plaintiffs' claims for which 
indemnity could properly be sought under Rule 14. Nor has Horn-
blower alleged any facts which suggest in any manner that Respondents 
agreed to indemnify Hornblower against liability arising in con-
nection with these transactions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Hornblower has strenuously argued in its brief that it is 
unfair to permit the University to hold it liable in the primary 
action, and such a result does, indeed, seem harsh; however, the 
harshness of that result would not be lessened by shifting liability 
from Hornblower to the individual third-party defendants, who were 
simply striving to carry out their official duties in good faith. 
Nor does the harshness of that result alter the fact that Hornblower's 
third-party complaint failed to state a cause of action against 
these individual Respondents. 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above in the foregoing 
sections of this brief, Respondents submit that the trial court did 
not err in dismissing Hornblower's third-party complaint. 
Respectfully submitted this /</"ti. day of September, 1979. 
Lyle W. Hillyard 
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
John W. Morrison 
David R. Melton 
KARON, MORRISON & SAVIKAS, LTD. 
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en. Jay R. Bingham, o. c. 
Hammond, Jay Dee Harris, Beverly 
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G. Plowman, w. B. Robins, Alva 
c. Snow, William R. Stockdale, 
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Dee A. Broadbent, and L. Mark Neuberger 
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Parsons, Behle & Latimer, 79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant and Defendant-Third-Party 
Plaintiffs Hornblower & Weeks, Hemphill, Noyes, Inc. 
David L. Wilkinson 
Office of the Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent-Plaintiff Utah State University 
of Agriculture and Applied Science 
Darwin C. Hansen 
506 South Main, Bountiful. Utah 84010 
Attorney for Respondent-Third-Party Defendant 
Donald A. Catron 
,/J /) 
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Dated: -----+9_._/~; <(....___._/~'-'-9 ____ _ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
